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Should people in the minimally conscious state have a (recognised) right to 
reassessment? 
J Samanta,1 K Yelden,2 S Sargent3 
Introduction 
Phenomenal developments in medical science means that many individuals 
can now survive catastrophic brain injuries which would have been fatal 
previously.  In emergency situations it is often impossible to predict clinical 
outcomes accurately and a range of aggressive emergency interventions will be 
carried out usually to give individuals the very best chance of survival.  
Nevertheless, some for survivors will be are left with seriously compromised 
levels of consciousness which can persist for months, years or even decades.  
The umbrella concept of ‘Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness’ (PDOC) is 
used for the group of conditions that range from the vegetative state (VS)4 to 
the minimally conscious state (MCS).  Vegetative state is defined as a state of 
‘wakefulness without awareness’ as these patients show sleep–wake cycles 
and a range of reflexive and spontaneous behaviours. People in minimally 
conscious state, on the other hand, exhibit minimal and inconsistent signs of 
awareness.5  While some MCS patients show awareness by looking at people 
or objects for only few seconds (low MCS); others may be at a level where 
simple choices can be made, even if this is only on occasions (high MCS).6  
People with PDOC require repeated assessments by experienced clinicians in 
order to differentiate MCS from VS and to identify those who will benefit from 
focused rehabilitation so that inconsistent behaviours may become the norm.7  
Although dependant on others for all their care, patients in PDOC do not 
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usually need to be connected to any life support machines. They are, for 
example, often able to sit out in special supported wheelchairs for short 
periods of time. They often show a range of reflexive and spontaneous 
behaviours such as the grasp reflex, bite reflex, chewing, teeth grinding, facial 
movements and make groaning sounds. These reflex and spontaneous 
responses may be interpreted wrongly as conscious and purposeful behaviours 
by their relatives, or even by inexperienced clinicians. Patients They may also 
react to painful stimuli by grimaces or withdrawal reflexes.  Although people in 
VS are not believed to experience either pain or pleasure8 the ability of 
minimally conscious patients to perceive pain and distress is well recognised.9  
For the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act 200510 people in MCS can be 
assumed normally to lack capacity to make decisions for themselves and these 
must be made by decision-makers in their best interests.11 Decision-making 
will extends from the more mundane, such as what to wear and where to sit, 
to those profound and often pivotal decisions that concern whether to 
commence, withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment.  
A considerable body of case law and academic commentary has developed 
with a particular focus on end-of-life decisions.  The foundation of the 
development of the common law in this area was the decision of Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland12 where the House of Lords arguably effectively ‘crossed the 
Rubicon’ in deciding that withdrawal of life sustaining treatment would be 
lawful and in the best interests of a man who had been in VS for several years.  
The common law position for patients in VS now appears to be well-settled in 
that provided that a definitive diagnosis has been reached, as confirmed by 
robust evidence and sufficient passage of time,13 the court will usually declare 
                                                          
8 Schnakers C, Zasler ND, Pain assessment and management in disorders of consciousness. (2007) Curr Opin 
Neurol 20 :620-6. 
9 Boly M, Faymonville ME, Schnakers C, Peigneux P et al., Perception of pain in the minimally conscious state 
with PET activation: an observational study. Lancet Neurol. 2008 Nov;7(11):1013-20; Demertzi A, Schnakers C, 
Ledoux D, Chatette C, Bruno MA et al., Different beliefs about pain perception in the vegetative and minimally 
conscious states: a European survey of medical and paramedical professionals. (2009) Prog Brian Res 177: 329-
38. 
10 Section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that “For the purposes of this Act a person lacks capacity 
in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the 
matter because of an impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.” 
11 Section 1(5) Mental Capacity Act 2005.  
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that withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) is in the 
person’s best interests.14  The situation is different for patients in MCS where 
evaluations of best interests will involve proper consideration of the 
advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action using a 
‘balance sheet’ approach.15  The jurisprudence in the area of best interests 
decision making for patients in MCS is complex and burgeoning and now 
includes a decision of the Supreme Court.16  
Expert care and treatment of patients in MCS is expensive17 and accurate 
assessment, and reassessment, is necessary for optimal management as well 
as appropriate targeting of health care resources.   Nevertheless, diagnosis and 
accurate prediction of clinical prognosis is inordinately difficult and requires 
regular assessment by health professionals with specific expertise.18 Most 
current diagnostic and evaluative techniques are based on subjective 
observations to detect patient awareness of themselves and their 
environments.19 Regular review of a patient’s initial diagnosis and assessment 
as to of whether transitions from VS to MCS (or vice versa) has occurred is vital 
to determine that person’s prognosis.  Regular review is also necessary to fund 
appropriate rehabilitation regimes and ultimately underpin decisions to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment where this is deemed to be in the person’s 
best interests.  Accurate assessment can facilitate targeting of advanced 
rehabilitation programmes and escalate care to benefit those who stand have 
most to gain.  In fact, there is evidence that intensive treatment and 
                                                          
14 Mason K, Laurie G, McCall Smith A. Mason & McCall Smith Medical Law & Ethics (2014) page 543. 
15 This balancing exercise articulated in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 by Thorpe LJ is qualitative 
rather than numerical. The balance sheet is not usually considered appropriate in confirmed cases of VS 
because all relevant factors tend to fall on one side of the scale. 
16 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2014] A.C. 591. 
17 Current estimates suggest that it costs around £7,500 a month to care for a patient in a VS and that costs for 
patients in a MCS are likely to be similar: Formby A, Cookson R, Halliday S (2015) Cost analysis of the Legal 
Declaratory Relief for Withdrawing Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) from Patients in the 
Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) in England and Wales CHE Research Paper 108 University of York.  
18 Hirschberg R, Giacino JT. The vegetative and minimally conscious states: Diagnosis, Prognosis and 
Treatment. Neuro Clin. (2011): 29(4): 773-786. 
19 Accurate diagnosis and assessment is considered to be difficult for several reasons that include: mental or 
physical disabilities that can impede the patient’s ability to respond; changes in the conditions of patients who 
are medically unstable; and because patient’s responses may be inconsistent or delayed (Houses of Parliament 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States, Postnote, (2015). 
No. 489, March available at http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-489/POST-PN-
489.pdf.  
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rehabilitation may facilitate recovery of consciousness in people with MCS.20 
Prevention of medical and neurological complications such as infections, 
pressure sore and seizures; achievement of good posture; use of specialist 
treatment techniques and medications are shown to help recovery in PDOC. 
However, implementation of such complex rehabilitation interventions usually 
requires input from highly specialist healthcare professionals. On the other 
hand, since re-evaluation also serves to identify those for whom further 
treatment is no longer in their best interests, it may pinpoint where therapy 
can be de-escalated or withheld appropriately.   
The question to be asked, therefore, is whether people in MCS should have a 
‘right’ to be reassessed.   To explore this issue a qualitative empirical approach 
was used. Four focus groups were used as the data gathering tool to ascertain 
policy and views of senior decision-makers including consultants in intensive 
care medicine and neurological rehabilitation, therapists, nurses, specialist 
care home managers and lawyers.21   The emergent themes from the data are 
contextualised within a theoretical framework against a backdrop of recent 
common law and professional guidance in England and Wales.    
 
Background   
(a) Clinical   
In Britain there are no reliable statistics on the incidence, or prevalence, of the 
number of people in MCS.  Estimates extrapolated from patients in UK nursing 
homes range from 4,000-16,000 for patients in VS and three times that figure 
for people in MCS.22 Since these figures do not include patients in the acute 
sector, or those cared for at home, these figures could be far higher.  Those 
people within this unknown cohort who are cared for within the community, 
                                                          
20Andrews K. Recovery of patients after four months or more in the persistent vegetative state. BMJ 
1993;306:1597-600. 
21 The authors would like to thank De Montfort University for generously sponsoring this project under a 
Research Investment Funding initiative. 
22 Houses of Parliament Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Vegetative and Minimally Conscious 
States, Postnote, (2015) No. 489, March available at 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-489/POST-PN-489.pdf. 
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may never have been formally reassessed since their initial diagnosis.23   This 
means that transition from VS to MCS and vice versa may not have been 
recognised.  By implication this means that an unknown number of patients 
may be missing out on (or even denied) the benefits of focused rehabilitation, 
or alternatively are being kept alive in situations where continued treatment is 
no longer in their best interests.   
Best practice mandates that reassessment should occur at regular intervals 
following initial diagnosis24 to identify and act upon changes in conscious 
awareness and clinical condition.  It is hoped that following publication of best 
practice guidelines all patients who are newly diagnosed as being in the MCS 
are more likely to receive appropriate reassessment.25 Regular assessment and 
review is the lynchpin for ascertaining whether a reversible cause for the 
disorder of consciousness can be identified and treated. It also underpins 
appropriate targeting of clinical management and efforts to rehabilitate as well 
as decisions about treatment withdrawal.   
Assessment and re-assessreassessment strategies have developed very 
considerably and particularly over the last decade. Early forms of neurological 
assessment such as the Glasgow Coma Scale are still employed in the acute 
stages and these offer reliable and objective initial and subsequent 
assessments to be carried out. Later on, once the patient’s condition has 
stabilised more nuanced behavioural assessment scales are relied upon for 
clinical re-evaluation such as the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R),26 the 
Sensory Modality Assessment Technique (SMART)27 and the Wessex Head 
Injury Matrix (WHIM).28  Current clinical guidance recommends one or more of 
                                                          
23 Gill-Thwaites H. Lotteries, loopholes and luck: Misdiagnosis in the vegetative state patient. Brain Injury, 
December 2006; 20(13–14): 1321–1328. 
24 Hirshberg R, Giacino JT. The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Diagnosis, Prognosis and Treatment. 
Neuro Clin 2011 29(4) 777-786. 
25 Since this research project commenced shortly after publication of the Royal College of Physicians guidelines 
this knowledge might not have filtered down to all decision-makers. 
26 Giacino, J T Kalmar K, Coma Recovery Scale-revised: Administration and scoring guidelines (2004) Available 
at http://www.tbims.org/combi/crs/CRS%20Syllabus.pdf (accessed 12th March 2016). 
27 Gill-Thwaites H, ‘The Sensory Modality Assessment Rehabilitation Technique - A tool for assessment and 
treatment of patients with severe brain injury in a vegetative state (1997)  Brain Injury 11 (10). 
28 Shiel A, Horn SA, Wilson BA, et al., The Wessex Head Injury Matrix (WHIM) main scale: a preliminary report 
on a scale to assess and monitor patient recovery after severe head injury (2000). Clin Rehabil 14:408–16.  
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these three assessments are used over time for purposes of formal structured 
assessment.  Even more cutting-edge developments are currently being 
investigated such as the use of functional Magnetic Rresonance Iimaging (fMRI) 
and Ppositron Eemission Ttomography (PET) scanning for diagnostic and 
prognostic purposes although their use has yet to be confirmed in clinical 
practice.29   
(b) Legal 
All decisions for adults who lack capacity must be made in their best interests 
in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.30  The Act requires that all 
decision-makers, including health professionals, ascertain the person’s best 
interests in accordance with seven statutory steps to identify those factors 
which are relevant to the decision to be made.31 In end of life situations which 
concern adults who lack capacity, doctors must apply the best interests 
checklist and their clinical skills to determine whether life-sustaining treatment 
is in the person’s best interests.32  Where commencing or continuing 
treatment is considered to be either futile, overly burdensome or intolerable, it 
might well be in that person’s best interests to withhold or withdraw 
treatment, including that which sustains life. However, a balance will need to 
be drawn.  For people in VS or MCS the law also requires that all decisions to 
withdraw clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) must be approved 
by the court by way of declaratory relief.33   This compares with most other 
clinical circumstances that do not concern withdrawal of CANH people in MCS 
or VS,34 where decisions are referred to the court only where a person’s best 
interests are challenged by interested parties or at least contested in some 
                                                          
29 Stender J, Gosseries O, Bruno MA, Charland-Verville V. Diagnostic precision of PET imaging and functional 
MRI in disorders of consciousness: a clinical validation study. (2014) Lancet 9;384(9942):514-22. 
30 Section 1(4) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires that “an act done, or decision made, …  for or on 
behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests.” 
31 Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  
32 Para 5.33 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice.  
33 By section 15(1)(c) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 the court may make declarations as to the lawfulness or 
otherwise of any act done, or yet to be done, in relation to that person. Court of Protection Rules (2007)  
Practice Direction 9E: Applications Relating to Serious Medical Treatment (para. 5a) requires that all decisions 
about the proposed withholding or withdrawal of CANH from a person in a VS or MCS are brought to the court 
for a declaration of best interests. Available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/practice-direction-
9e-applications-relating-to-serious-medical-treatment-effective-from-1-july-2015/ Accessed on 12th March 
2016.  
34 Practice Direction 9E and section 15 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Other serious treatment decisions 
(such as therapeutic sterilisation) also require declaratory relief from the Court of Protection. 
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other way.  For people in definitive VS, who have no awareness of themselves 
or their environments, the principle assumption is that life-sustaining 
treatment is not in their best interests because it is futile.  In the case of Bland 
it was argued that for Arguably, for the persons in permanent VS, it is must be 
a matter of complete indifference to them whether they live or die.35  For this 
reason the mandatory requirement for court approval for persons in VS has 
been criticised on the basis that there is no legal basis for treating this group of 
patients differently from that of any others.36  
 
This particular perspective, however, fails to recognise that people in VS and 
MCS are not actively dying: they are usually often not terminally ill.  With 
appropriate care and medical attention they may live for some considerable 
time.  This is apparent even if a ‘ceiling of care’ is introduced on clinical 
grounds, meaning that specified treatments are to be withheld in the event of 
an acute life-threatening event, or clinical deterioration, are to be withheld.  
Furthermore, for people in VS or MCS withdrawal of CANH, even when this is 
incontrovertibly in the person’s best interests, can result in a prolonged dying 
process over several days, particularly where the body of the brain damaged 
person is otherwise in very good health.37    
For the purposes of the law and withdrawal of treatment decisions, the 
distinction between diagnosed MCS compared with permanent VS is self-
evident.  The courts apply different deliberations that can lead potentially to 
very different outcomes.  In the United Kingdom the seminal decision that 
considered the best interests of the person in permanent VS was Airedale Trust 
v Bland.38  Anthony Bland had sustained catastrophic head injuries which led to 
him being in permanent VS following an incident at a football stadium in 1989.  
After three years, following which there had been no improvement in his 
condition, the hospital sought a declaration that withdrawal of assisted 
                                                          
35 Airedale trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. per Lord Keith. 
36 Lewis P. Withdrawal of treatment from a patient in a permanent vegetative state: judicial involvement and 
innovative “treatment”. Med L Rev 2007; 15:392–9.  
37 Withdrawal of treatment from patients who are terminally ill will typically occur within hours or days 
whereas death following withdrawal of CANH from patients in VS or MCS can take days or even weeks:  
Wade DT. Ethical issues in diagnosis and management of patients in the permanent vegetative state. BMJ 
2001;322:352. 
38 Airedale Trust v Bland [1993] 1 AC 789. 
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nutrition and hydration would be lawful.39 The House of Lords justified its 
unanimous decision ultimately on the basis that it was not in Anthony Bland’s 
best interests to prolong his life where no benefit could be derived from 
treatment.40 Lord Mustill, whilst concurring with the decision, expressed his 
concerns that through the medium of the court, one group of citizens had 
authority to terminate the lives of another. For this reason he cautioned that 
the court’s role must be to examine rigorously the process by which the 
solution is reached, as well as the legal foundations upon which decisions rest.  
The fear was that the pressures created by this very extreme case could distort 
the law and lead to anomalies in future cases where issues were similar but 
more finely balanced. 41 In the years that followed Bland it certainly seems that 
these fears about encroaching precedent did in fact materialise, at least 
incrementally, to other less definitive situations of VS or ‘near-VS’ conditions.42   
These decisions confirm that for people diagnosed definitively as being in 
permanent VS the decisions of the courts will fall in favour of withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment. 43  In these circumstances it appears that for people 
in permanent VS the court’s role is little more than an exercise to confirm the 
diagnosis following which a declaration that treatment withdrawal will be 
lawful is made.44   
That same certainty does not extend to decisions for people who are minimally 
conscious, even though applications to the court are also required prior to 
withdrawal of treatment. Decisions that concern withdrawal of treatment from 
persons in a MCS are less certain and are made using a balance sheet 
approach.  Factors of perceived benefits from continuation or initiation of 
treatment will be weighed against countervailing disadvantages.  The outcome 
of applications to the court are therefore dependent upon a range of fact and 
                                                          
39 Ibid. at 885. 
40 Ibid. at 885. 
41 Ibid. at 886. 
42 Several cases followed Bland where the safeguards referred to in that case were incrementally side-lined. 
For example, Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994] 2 All ER 403; Re G [1995] 3 Med L Rev 80; Swindon and 
Marlborough NHS Trust v S [1995] 3 Med LR 84; Re D (1997) 38 BMLR 1; Re H (adult: incompetent) (1997) 38 
BMLR 11.  
43 The cases heard between Bland and Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2014] A.C. 
591 were complicated, to some extent, in that the clinical criteria for diagnosing MCS were published only in 
2002. It seems likely that some of the patients previously thought to be in VS were likely to have been in MCS.   
44 Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and Welfare Decisions for Adults who Lack 
Capacity) [2006] 2 FLR 373. 
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specific circumstances.45 For example, in M (Adult Patient) (Minimally 
Conscious: Withdrawal of Treatment)46 despite relatively strong evidence of 
the woman’s own prior views, it was determined that M’s positive experiences, 
alongside the fundamental starting point of respect for the sanctity of life, 
tipped the scales in favour of continuation of treatment despite evidence that 
she could experience pain and discomfort and countervailing evidence from 
her family that she would not have wished to live her life in the circumstances 
such as theseshe was in.  
For this reason accurate assessment as to whether a person is vegetative or 
minimally conscious and whether that condition is permanent or not is the 
cornerstone of appropriate decision-making.  For this reason disputes as to 
accurate diagnosis can lead to adjournment and considerable delay in legal 
proceedings. Accurate evaluation is therefore subject to considerable judicial 
scrutiny in determining whether withdrawal of CANH, or withholding other 
forms of life-sustaining treatment, is in the person’s best interests.47   
 
The empirical research study 
(a) Methodology 
The fundamental research question that was asked was whether there should 
be a right to re-assessreassessment for patients in a MCS. Self-selected 
participants, who were all senior decision-makers in their fields, were invited 
on the basis of their interest and specific expertise. Since reassessment 
decisions typically involve multidisciplinary teams a range of participants were 
invited including and included health professionals, lawyers and policy-
makers.48  Given that reassessment decisions tend to be collective decisions 
focus groups were selected as the method of choice in order to explore group 
norms and attitudes. Focus groups are also a recognised technique that can be 
used to explore divergent views and opinions and are therefore particularly 
useful for obtaining multiple perspectives on a topic. The inevitable interaction 
                                                          
45 W v M [2012] 1 All ER 1313. 
46 [2012] 1 WLR 1653. 
47 CWM TAF University v F (2015) EWHC 2533 (Fam).  
48 Health professionals included consultants in Rehabilitation Medicine, General practitioners with a special 
interest in neurology, specialist anaesthetists, neurologists, medical negligence lawyers, specialist residential 
care managers and commissioners, occupational and speech therapists, physiotherapists and specialist nurses.   
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that occurs between group members encourages direct questioning and can 
lead to re-evaluation of personal and possibly previously unrecognised 
perspectives.  It was also anticipated that interactions between the 
participants (as senior decision-makers in their respective fields) would 
encourage tacit challenging of professional group norms and hopefully expose 
underlying tacit assumptions which could not be accessed easily with 
alternative qualitative approaches, such as elite interviews.49   
 
Four focus groups were held with a total of 29 participants with each group 
comprising between 5 and 11 individuals.  Sessions lasted around two hours 
and duration were moderated by an experienced facilitators to encourage 
exploration of the consider the research question from myriad multiple 
perspectives.50 Prior to commencement participants had been were briefed on 
the study rationale and the approach to be used.  A standard set of 
preconceived prompts were available to initiate and stimulate further 
discussion if required.  At the start of each session the participants were 
advised to communicate and interact with one another, rather than with the 
facilitators who intervened, on occasion, to explore areas of ambiguity and to 
challenge apparent inconsistencies.  All sessions were voice recoded and 
augmented by written notes that were used to inform initial axial coding and 
subsequent relational statements that emerged.     
Verbatim transcripts were created within a week of each session and verified 
for accuracy against the voice recordings.  These were colour coded to ensure 
that speech extractions could be contextualised appropriately during each 
session and to identify and track each participant’s personal contribution.  
Unabridged transcripts were used for the subsequent analysis to enhance the 
rigor of the methodology.51 
The transcripts were analysed using the tenets of grounded theory 
methodology. 52 Three phases of coding were used to arrive at a model that 
provided an explanation of the focus group results. Grounded theory 
                                                          
49 Duggleby W. ‘What about focus group interaction data?’ (2005) Qualitative Health Research 15(6) 832-840. 
50 This project received advance ethical clearance from De Montfort University.  
51 Bloor M, Frankland J, Thomas M, Robson K, Focus groups in social research (London: 2001).    
52 For a useful discussion of grounded theory see Charmaz K, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide 
Through Qualitative Analysis (Sage, 2006).  
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methodology uses induction and interpretation, rather than deductive 
reasoning, to arrive at an explanation that is derived from, or “grounded” in 
the data.   This means that rather than testing a hypothesis, grounded theory 
builds an explanation of the data that is collected.53 
While there are many academically accepted variants on grounded theory, all 
agree that analysis is done through a series of data interpretation of increasing 
levels of abstraction. 54 The first stage of analysis for this research was initial 
coding, where the focus group transcripts were examined and an initial list of 
codes were identified. 55 The second stage of axial coding involved analysis of 
these initial codes which were then used to answer a series of questions about 
the environment in which decisions about whether to re-assessreassess 
patients were taken. 56  The third stage involved relational statements 
development was built from the process of axial coding.57  The relational 
statements construct an account and justification, from which the grounded 
theory or explanation begins to emerge.58 In the final stage of analysis, a 
grounded theory was derived from the relational statements.  Subsequent 
discussions of the research team took place to agree on areas of convergence 
and to ensure that critical issues had not been overlooked.59   
(b) Results 
In every group it became palpably clear that the influence of seemingly 
capricious chance factors, such as ‘being in the wrong place at the wrong time’ 
could have a profound and significant impact upon clinical outcomes and 
subsequent opportunities for rehabilitation.  Seemingly fortuitous variables 
could exert considerable influence on clinical outcomes. Chance events such as 
where, when and how the index injury occurred, whether and where 
emergency expert acute care was provided, and also whether clinical 
                                                          
53 Charmaz K, pages 4-5. See also Strauss A, Corbin J, Basics of Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 2nd 
edition, 1998), 12-14.  
54 See Charmaz K, 4-10. 
55 See Charmaz K, 47-50.  
56 For a discussion on axial coding, see Strauss A, Corbin J, 123-142, and also Scott Wilson K, Relating the 
Categories in Grounded Theory Analysis: Using a Conditional Relationship Guide and Reflective Coding Matrix 
(2004) 9(1) The Qualitative Report 112. 
57 See Strauss A, Corbin J 145-146. 
58 Ibid.  
59 In-depth Further methodological details for this study can be found in “Grounded theory analysis of a focus 
group study: should minimally conscious people have a right to reassessment? Sargent S, Samanta J, Yelden K 
(2016) SAGE Research Methods Case Study IN PRESS. 
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rehabilitation expertise was readily available, all played significant roles in 
influencing the outcomes for patients.  
The variability and range of opinion as to what constituted an ‘initial’ 
assessment was also a striking factor.  Variables such as where the injury 
occurred and whether emergency neurological care was readily available 
influenced very considerably the early diagnosis and whether intensive care or 
referral to a centre of excellence was made. Further areas of shared concern 
centred on the lack of predictability in the constitution of clinical and other 
decision-making teams, during the initial acute stage as well as after 
stabilisation.  The availability of expert neurological and rehabilitation acumen 
was considered to be crucially important.60   
Considerations of rights-based expectations was considered to be of secondary 
importance in this context.  and even against recognition of current focus on 
patients’ enforceable rights.  In fact, this conception of legally enforceable 
rights  was not considered to be part of the reality for determining whether a 
patient could, or should, be clinically reassessed.   What emerged in the 
discussions was that many factors which that could not be predicted, or 
controlled for, could influence very considerably whether a person would be 
referred to a relevant considered for referral for specialist for re-
assessreassessment. From the participants’ perspective it was evident that 
whether formalised reassessment took place depended mainly upon who, or 
what, was insisting that a pressing for clinical review took to take place.  The 
main drivers identified came from family members, close relatives, or carers as 
well as commissioning bodies or even the courts.   
A shared concern of several participants was the perceived lack of a clear 
medical evidence base from which to proceed by way of clinical protocols or 
definitive guidance. This was noteworthy on several counts.  At the time that 
the focus groups were held evidence based clinical guidance from the Royal 
College of Physicians had just been published.  This guidance is intended to 
                                                          
60 Although the central findings from each group were similar there were apparent differences of emphasis in 
each.  However, no obvious influence (for example from the occupational make-up or majority specialism of 
the participants) was apparent. Two of the groups looked at reassessment mainly from the perspectives of 
treatment withdrawal decisions. One was particularly impressed by the influence of contextual factors on 
whether a patient would be reassessed and the final group also considered newer developments in 
reassessment strategies and what this might mean for future management.     
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systemise the approach to diagnosis, management, and end-of-life care for 
people in VS and MCS. 61 It is certainly possible that at the time of the study 
this guidance had not been digested, responded to, or acted upon, by the 
majority of participants, although some participants were very familiar already.  
Nevertheless, participants from across the board from primary care through 
across to specialist rehabilitation services expressed concern about the 
apparent dearth of a coherent structure to guide decision-making.  The new 
Royal College of Physicians Guidelines states that all patients in PDOC should 
have at least an annual review, or re-assessreassessment, by an appropriately 
skilled assessor until either they emerge from PDOC or they die.62 
Nevertheless, this is still yet to become the norm or even the expected best 
practice on account of access availability to specialist care as well as and 
resource constraints.  
Decisions to reassess clinically depended on factors such as where the patient 
was, the composition and knowledge of the treatment team and whether 
family or friends were advocating for further review. These triggers were what 
led, usually, to decisions to re-assessreassess. However, re-assessreassessment 
is only one of a range of options that might occur when consideration is made 
of the patient’s condition and prognosis. 
(c) Statement of Grounded Theory 
On the basis of the data a two-part enquiry into re-assessreassessment could 
be discerned: first, whether the question of re-assessreassessment was ever 
raised; and second, whether that re-assessment would be provided.  
The issue of whether re-assessment was likely to be raised was influenced 
strongly by the presence of interested others: whether the person in MCS had 
highly involved family or friends who would raise the possibility with the care 
team, and whether the treatment team within the clinical setting had sufficient 
specialist knowledge and expertise in assessment, reassessment and research 
regimes. Without these variables in place, it was considered unlikely that the 
issue of (re)assessment would arise unless this was triggered ultimately by 
preparation, or evidential presentation, for an application to the court that 
                                                          
61 Royal College of Physicians. Prolonged disorders of consciousness: National clinical guidelines. London, RCP. 
2013.  
62 Ibid. page 43 
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withholding or withdrawing al treatment would be lawful and in a person’s 
best interests.     
On the evidence of the data once the issue of reassessment had arisen, 
whether or not it was carried out also depended upon a range of variables.  
Potential conflicts could arise between hospital management, or perhaps 
commissioning bodies who might be concerned about appropriate use of 
resources, or that scarce resources ought to be are targeted at people with 
more predictable clinical outcomes or response to rehabilitation or treatment. 
Ultimately, the decision to re-assessreassess lies with the treating clinician.  
Doctors must grapple with myriad issues.  These include recognition of what 
resources are available and the need to follow evidence-based guidance.  
Further potential tensions included possible constraints of commissioning 
regimes and bodies, and referral opportunities.  All of these factors would 
influence decision-making within the framework of regulatory and professional 
ethical obligations.   
Re-assessReassessment could result in a range of outcomes for people in MCS.  
Positive reassessment results often led to intensification of efforts to stimulate 
and rehabilitate the patient to greater and more sustained levels of conscious 
awareness.  Results of clinical review could lead to decisions to maintain the 
status quo and schedule further review for a future time.   It is also possible to 
find that continued efforts to rehabilitate are no longer in the best interests of 
the person which would prompt an application to the court for declaratory 
relief.  
The emergent theoretical basis for re-assessreassessment is a decision-making 
process that is context-driven.  In the practical healthcare arena the issue of 
whether a legal right to re-assessreassessment exists is lost ultimately in the 
highly subjective and uncertain environment in which the question and 
provision of re-assessreassessment occurs.63  In view of the implications for 
potential rehabilitation and ultimately the possible withholding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment for people in MCS the fundamental question is to 
what extent should access to re-assessreassessment be underpinned as a legal 
or (at least) a moral right within a formal procedural framework?  
                                                          
63 Nevertheless, caution is required to avoid making inferences beyond the study population. 
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Implications of this study and discussion 
(a) Rights based analysis 
Minimally conscious adults are perhaps the paradigmatic category of people 
who lack decision-making capacity.64  Notwithstanding this, the conclusion that 
people lack decision-making capacity is not an "off-switch" for their rights and 
freedoms.65 In the context of the rights-based arena suffering, or at least the 
potential to suffer, has to be taken seriously.66  Without appropriate 
assessment and review the possibility of failure to recognise covert suffering, 
or even emergence to a higher state of conscious awareness, is all too real.   
 
It is certainly possible that life in a MCS might be worse that being in a VS, .67  a 
This factor that prompted considerable critical commentary following of the 
court’s decision not to authorise withdrawal of treatment in W v M:68 the first 
case in the United Kingdom to consider an application for authorisation to 
withdraw CANH from a person in MCS.69  This view, however, is not universally 
held. Chan and Tipoe, for example, consider that the value of life of a person 
should have nothing to with an outsider’s perspective of the intensity or 
duration of that person’s positive and negative experiences.  Only theat person 
herself can determine whether her life is worth living and to do otherwise is to 
risk real discrimination.70  
 
But according to a rights-based analysis, to what extent do people in MCS have 
a ‘right’ to be re-assessreassessed? A fundamental distinction is often drawn 
between legal and moral rights.  Legal scholars typically consider ‘rights’ as 
being those interests that exist in the terrain of entitlements and obligations.  
                                                          
64 On the basis of section 3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which states that “a person is unable to make a 
decision for himself if he is unable to (a) understand the information relevant to the decision (b) retain that 
information (c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or (d) 
communicate that decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means).  
65 Wye Valley NHS Trust v B [2015] EWCOP 60 at para 11 per Jackson J. 
66 Yamin AE, ‘Will we take suffering seriously? Reflections on health means and why we should care? (2008) 
10(1) Health and Human Rights: An International Journal 45. 
66 Johnson LSM, The what applying a human rights framework to health means and why we should care? 
(2008) 10(1) Health and Human Rights: An International Journal 45. 
67 Johnson LSM, The right to die in the minimally conscious state (2011) JME 37: 175-8. 
68 W v M [2012] 1 All ER 1313. 
69 Wilkinson D, Savulescu J, Is it better to be minimally conscious than vegetative? JME 2013;39:557–8; 
Jackson, E,  The minimally conscious state and treatment withdrawal: W v M JME (2012) 39 (9) 559-561. 
70 Chan TK, Tipoe GL, Should we continue treatment for M? The benefits of living JME (2014);40:131-133. 
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If such a right is violated the right bearer will be assured of a remedy from a 
court or other adjudicative body. 71 According to this analysis, if a right is 
without a remedy it reverts to being little more than a mere aspirational 
statement.72   
Dworkian conceptions of rights tend to distinguish between positive rights, 
which call for affirmative action, and those supposedly negative or libertarian 
rights that require public bodies to abstain from interference or at least to 
refrain from specific conduct.  Examples of positive rights typically include 
those which incorporate economic and social elements such as rights to health 
and access to public healthcare resources.   Nevertheless, this seemingly 
pragmatic distinction starts to break down in that to some extent recognition 
of any right requires at least some measure of positive action by providers.73 
Enforcement of positive rights, for instance, might be achieved only when 
public providers actively prevent conduct that limits access to existing services. 
A conventional stance in law is that positive rights cannot, or will not, be 
enforced by public providers of healthcare due to the government’s reluctance 
to allocate resources as a legal remedy.  For this reason there is a significant 
difference between remedies designed to prevent public providers from acting 
in a certain way, and remedies designed to compel parties to deliver particular 
services.  In granting the latter an adjudicator steps into the role of policy-
maker regarding the allocation of resources which is fundamentally a 
legislative function.74 Nevertheless, conceiving of rights as being only those 
which are legally enforceable seems to be a very narrow perception indeed. 
Similar distinctions are drawn sometimes between rights based on 
enforceability or justiciability in the context of the hypothetical non-
justiciability of economic and social rights.  These debates neglect the range of 
possibilities for judicial enforcement of rights amongst different courts as well 
as the jurisdictional powers of individual courts. 75 This analysis also neglects 
                                                          
71 Dworkin R, Taking rights seriously (1977) page 82-90; Finnis J, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980). 
72 Ibid p299-301. 
73 Shue H, Basic rights, Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (2nd Ed, Princeton University Press 1996). 
74 Kinney ED, Clark BA, Provision for Health and Health Care in the Constitutions of the Countries of the World,  
(2004) Vol 37 Cornell International Law Journal 285.  
75 Murphy T, Health and Human Rights Hart Publishing 2013. 
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the potential influence of economic and social rights even if these are 
technically unenforceable by the courts.76  
Forecasts about perceived growth in patient rights are influencing public 
perceptions about healthcare provision.77  It has been similarly acknowledged 
the ‘radical shift’ in public attitudes and society’s focus on individuals’ 
enforceable rights.78   
In this study, however, the data and its analysis failed to show that traditional 
conceptions of legal ‘rights’ was at the forefront of decision-makers’ minds 
when dealing with re-assessreassessment decisions.  Instead, concerns tended 
to be focused on the perceived dearth of set protocols, relevant expertise, and 
the capricious influence of chance factors that could all contribute to the 
outcome.  In terms of rights-based discourse the law is clear that there are no 
substantive rights to medical treatment or any particular diagnostic modalities.  
A patient, or her relatives, cannot demand and expect to receive a healthcare 
intervention that is not deemed to be clinically appropriate.  Lord Donaldson’s 
clear assertion that “doctors can recommend treatment A in preference to 
treatment B. They can also refuse to adopt treatment C on the grounds that it 
is medically contraindicated or for some other reason is a treatment which 
they could not consciously administer”79 is still accurate and good law today. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal’s assertion in Burke, still rings true that while 
doctors are expected to consider patient requests for specific treatments the 
decision to offer that treatment remains a clinical one.80 To some degree the 
recognition that the courts will not override clinical judgement has morphed 
into established judicial practice and almost a point of principle.81 In fact, to 
use a “declaration of the court to twist the arm of some other clinician, as yet 
unidentified, to carry out these procedures or to put pressure upon the 
Secretary of State to provide a hospital where these procedures may be 
                                                          
76 The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (ETS No 164) (The Oviedo Convention, 1997) 
exemplify the significance of so called ‘non-enforceable’ rights.   
77 British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today (2004) BMJ Publishing Group p24. 
78 Woolf LCJ, Are the courts excessively deferential to the medical profession? Med Law Rev (2001) 9(1):1-16. 
79 Re J [1991] 3 All ER 930 at 934. 
80 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003. 
81 Montgomery J, Conscientious objection: personal and professional ethics in the public square (2015) Med L 
Rev 23(22) 200 at 205. 
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undertaken is an abuse of the process of the court and should not be 
tolerated.”82 This position has been confirmed more recently in the context of 
people in MCS.83 So, to what extent are questions about positive rights to 
reassessment meaningless for this group of patients? Evidently the law, as well 
as the study participants, assert in unison that there are no positive 
enforceable legal rights to reassessment.  As long ago as In 1992 Lord 
Donaldson could not conceive of any circumstances in which the court would 
require doctors to adopt an intervention or course of treatment which was 
contraindicated as not being in the best interests of their patients.  But today, 
aAlthough doctors are still duty bound to treat patients in accordance with 
their clinical judgement there is evidence of increasing judicial intervention in 
decision-making.84  
This is not to downplay the significance of moral claims to reassessment. 
Although traditional moral rights theorists such as Grotius and Locke have 
tended to associate moral rights as being powers associated with liberties, 
modern conventions and declarations of human rights typically extend these to 
incorporate social and economic rights.  Ultimately though, moral rights, as 
with legal rights, tend to be correlatives of duties. A positive claim for 
reassessment, for example, would require a suitably qualified e clinicians to 
give effect to that right which would then becomes their duty.  
Notwithstanding these established principles it appears that a quiet and largely 
unnoticed shift is occurring has occurred albeit perhaps only in the context of 
applications to the court for withholding or withdrawal or treatment decisions 
from patients in MCS or VS.  The courts now require that ‘every step’ is taken 
to ‘diagnose the patient’s true condition’ before any application is made to the 
court.85 For these purposes, assessment tools such as SMART and WHIM play a 
‘crucial role’ in ascertain the patient’s clinical condition.86  It seems that for 
these purposes at least, reassessment techniques such as SMART and WHIM 
have now become part of the law.  
                                                          
82 R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 para. 38. 
83 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67; AVS and a NHS Foundation Trust 
[2011] EWCA Civ 7, per LJ Ward at para. 35. 
84 Mason JK, Laurie GT. Mason & McCall Smith’s Law & Medical Ethics (2011) OUP.  
85 Re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious state: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2012] EWHC 2443 (Fam) Baker 
J. para. 259.  
86 Ibid. para 258. 
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(b) The concept of “Fairness”: A just and equitable access to re-evaluation 
A cross cutting theme that was evident across all four focus groups was 
concern about the commissioning of re-assessreassessments.  At times, and 
particularly amongst clinical participantsstaff, there was a palpable reluctance 
to consider whether lack of resources might operate as a potential constraint 
against access to re-assessreassessment.  The inherent challenges of 
commissioning care more generally for patients in MCS was recognised due to 
the inherent clinical instability of people in this group and particularly during in 
the acute phase following initial injury.  Further challenges involved the 
labyrinthine complexities caused by different funding regimes that apply in 
respect of medical and social care.87 In England, for example, the first three to 
four months of care is paid for usually by NHS England and continued 
subsequently by Clinical Commissioning Groups.88 Recognised problems with 
this arrangement include potential conflicts of interests in respect of paying for 
and supplying long-term care. Decisions to purchase expensive items of 
equipment such as specialist wheelchairs, for example, might be postponed so 
that a subsequent funder would bear the cost ultimately.89 Clearly, systems 
that permit perverse incentives such as these do not place patient need and 
best interests at centre-stage.  
Tensions between providers and commissioners of healthcare are all too 
apparent in publicly funded healthcare systems.  Commissioning bodies have 
duties to provide comprehensive services to communities as a whole and 
decisions based on collective justice have to be made by application of fair and 
consistent principles.  In order for commissioners to achieve their statutory 
purpose, competing interests of communities and patient groups have to be 
weighed and balanced against each other.90 According to macroeconomic 
principles it follows that decisions to invest in one area of need is likely to be 
achieved to the detriment of another.  The tensions are further increased in 
                                                          
87 Houses of Parliament Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Vegetative and Minimally Conscious 
States, Postnote, (2015) No. 489, March available at 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-489/POST-PN-489.pdf.   
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid.   
90 Newdick C, Derrett S, Access, Equity and the Role of Rights in Healthcare. Health Care Analysis (2006) 14: 
157-168  p 159. 
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that clinicians owe a duty of care to each of their patients, rather than to t 
society in general.   
Claims that concern positive rights to public resources are considered to be 
challenging as far as legal enforceability is concerned.   As unelected bodies the 
courts have been reluctant to arbitrate over individual rights to healthcare and 
other economic resources since favouring one group will invariably constrain 
the ability of other groups to benefit.  Recognition of individual rights may be 
won only at the expense of the right of equal access for equal need.91 
Recognition of substantive rights provide legally enforceable access to specific 
resources whereas procedural rights serve to guarantee that a decision about 
access will be made according to an appropriate process.92 For this reason the 
courts have tended to differentiate between procedural and substantive rights 
and are more amenable to adjudicate where allegations concern procedural 
impropriety. 93  Although English law has been reluctant to grant substantive 
rights of access, on occasion such rights have been created.94  Although it has 
been suggested that too much recognition of substantive rights might 
undermine equity and fairness within the NHS,95  an unanswered question 
remains. How does one achieve equity with public resources, such as 
healthcare, when ranking of priorities between competing interests are 
inherently subjective and upon which the views of reasonable people might 
well differ.  
Allocating health care resources is a nexus that involves multiple compromises 
to be made to accommodate competing demands and constraints. The court’s 
recognition that “difficult and agonising judgements have to be made as to 
how a limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the 
maximum number of patients”96 is still true today.  Policy choices have to be 
made by the state to apportion fair distributions to protect competing rights 
and interests particularly in a publicly funded health care environment. 
Notwithstanding the court’s traditional reluctance to become embroiled in 
                                                          
91 Ibid at p162. 
92 Ibid at p160. 
93 Re J (a minor) [1992] 4 All ER 614; R v Cambridge DHA, ex parte B [1995] 2 All ER 129. 
94 Newdick C, Derrett S, Access, Equity and the Role of Rights in Healthcare. Health Care Analysis (2006) 14: 
157-168 at 162.   
95 Ibid. at p163. 
96 R v Cambridge DHA ex p B [1995] 2 All ER 129 per Thomas Bingham MR. 
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resource allocation decisions, relatively recent and mainly politically driven 
changes are being introduced.  The NHS Constitution, introduced as part of the 
Health Act 2009, for example, sets out the right to receive NHS services free of 
charge, apart from limited exceptions.97 This specifically includes the right to 
receive treatments, drugs and programmes that have been recommended by 
NICE if these are deemed clinically appropriate. 98 Nevertheless, there is 
widespread confusion about enforceability since much of the constitution 
consists of pledges or aims rather than enforceable rights. Despite a clear 
expectation that they should be delivered, there is little evidence of 
enforceable potential. 99 Positive rights to health care are often rightly 
regarded as economic freedoms and as such are more contentious for public 
policy when compared with negative rights to be free from state 
interference.100 Nevertheless, the Government is coming under increasing 
pressure to create and recognise tangible rights to health care.101  
While the Health Act 2009 only makes provision that all providers of 
NHS services must have regard to the Constitution, there is no legal 
enforceability of the NHS’s “pledges” within the document. The NHS 
Constitution in itself does not confer new rights or change the law, 
instead it is a declaratory document of rights that already exist. These 
rights are underpinned by statute or the Common Law and are 
effectively legal rights, but as yet no single piece of legislation sets out 
to detail thoese rights.   In reality the pledges within the NHS 
Constitution are little more than statements of principle.  This means 
that commissioners and other funding bodies should consider the NHS 
                                                          
97 NHS Constitution (26 March  2013).  
http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Documents/2013/the-nhs-
constitution-for-england-2013.pdf. 
98 NICE (the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) is an independent organisation producing 
guidance on drugs and treatments. ‘Recommended for use by NICE’ refers to a type of NICE recommendation 
set out in legislation. The relevant health body is obliged to fund specified NICE recommendations from a date 
no longer than three months from the publication of the recommendation unless, in certain limited 
circumstances, a longer period is specified. 
99 Hudson B, NHS constitution has barely achieved anything since it was introduced (21 August 2015) Guardian 
http://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2015/aug/21/nhs-constitution-achieved-nothing-since-
introduced. 
100 Newdick C, Derrett S, Access, Equity and the Role of Rights in Healthcare. Health Care Analysis (2006) 14: 
157-168  p 159. 
101 A typical example is the NHS ‘Your right: urgent two-week referral’ for patients suspected to have cancer.  
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Constitution when making decisions but that the pledges themselves 
are ultimately unenforceable.102 
   
(c) Treatment withdrawal 
Following enactment of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 the Court of Protection 
must be involved in all decisions to withdraw CANH from people in MCS by 
means of a declaration that to do so would be in the person’s best interests.103 
For patients in VS the court’s role is to ascertain sufficient proof that the 
condition is permanent, whereupon declaratory relief will be granted.  This is 
not the same for patients in the MCS.  In these circumstances the court must 
examine carefully the substantive diagnosis and the premises of its base with 
very considerable care. The outcomes of applications for declaratory relief 
indicate that whether withdrawal of CANH is in the person’s best interests is 
entirely fact dependent and sensitive. It is therefore vitally important that 
every step is taken to diagnose a person’s true condition before declaratory 
relief is applied for.104 
In the first case to consider whether CANH should be withdrawn from a 
woman in MCS Baker J. directed that standardised assessment would always 
be necessary prior to making an application to the court.105  This was on the 
basis that every step could be taken to ascertain the patient's true condition 
before a decision could be made. He stated that no application for an order 
authorising the withdrawal of CANH from a person in MCS should be made 
unless a SMART or WHIM assessment, or other validated equivalent, had been 
carried out over a period of time to track the person’s progress and recovery.  
This then surely leads to a tension with the principle that judges should not 
override professional judgements or apply ‘pressure upon the Secretary of 
State’ to provide facilities for these procedures to be carried out.106  
                                                          
102 Patients Association, The NHS Constitution: Fact or Fiction http://www.patients-association.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/NHS-Constitution-Fact-or-Fiction.pdf. 
103 Section 15 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005; Court of Protection Rules (S.I. 2007/1744) Practice Direction 9E. 
104 CWM TAF University (applicant) v F [2015] EWHC 2533 (Fam) para 13.  
105 W v M [2012] 1 All ER 1313. 
106 Burke, R (on the application of) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA para 38. 
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Similarly, as the court recognised in Re P107 current best practice guidance 
provides that diagnosis of VS or MCS should be based upon the results from 
validated structured assessment tools. For Newton J. the case before him was 
yet “another stark example of the absolute necessity for a structured 
assessment to have  
oOccurred” since “misdiagnosis (of people who are said to be in a vegetative 
state but are in truth in a minimally conscious state) [and] … misdiagnosis is 
said to be some 40%.”108 While Newton J. did not suspect any malafides of the 
treating clinicians the difficulties of reaching a definitive diagnosis without the 
benefit of rigorous and reliable assessment and reassessment techniques were 
considerable.  In these circumstances it was considered to be an ‘absolute 
necessity’ for proper neurological assessment to be carried out, ideally with 
MRI at established intervals, in order to bring together a comprehensive 
evidence base before reaching the ultimate conclusion as to the level of 
awareness of the patient.  Not to do so was to risk ‘cataclysmic injustice’ to the 
vulnerable person concerned.109 
 
Accurate diagnosis of the MCS is a complex process requiring assessment at 
several points in time by a multi-disciplinary team of experts. Assessment and 
reassessment is further complicated in that the patient’s responses may be 
delayed, inconsistent and influenced by a range of confounding factors. Clinical 
conditions can change over time and there is always a degree of subjectivity is 
involved when carrying out and interpreting the findings, together with input 
from a wide range of sources and health professional disciplines including 
physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech and language therapy, 
neuropsychology, nursing and rehabilitation medicine.110  Theis diagnosis 
should then be confirmed by a second senior consultant. According to current 
guidelines of the Royal College of Physicians the initial assessment prior to an 
application to the court should include a comprehensive medical assessment 
by means of a validated structured neurological assessment tool such as the 
                                                          
107 Re P [2015] EWCOP 42. 
108 Re P [2015] EWCOP 42 at para 8.  
109 Re P [2015] EWCOP 42 para 48. 
110 Royal College of Physicians, Prolonged disorders of consciousness: national clinical guidelines (2013) Royal 
College of Physicians, London. At 14. 
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WHIM or SMART. Best interests meetings prior to an application to the court 
are also required in consultation with the patient’s relatives.111 
 
In contrast to people diagnosed definitively in permanent VS, the law offers 
little substantive guidance as to whether withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment will be in the best interests of a person who is minimally conscious. 
ir best interests. Whereas a precedent was set in Bland that it is not in the best 
interests of person in definitive permanent VS to be maintained in life by 
CANH, no equivalent ruling exists in relation to MCS patients.112 Each case has 
to be considered on its own merits. In W v M 113 the court held, in a 
controversial decision, that it was in the best interests of the woman to 
continue life support together with provision of enhanced efforts to 
rehabilitate her in order to enhance her quality of life.  This findingverdict, 
however, was not repeated in United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N114 
where the Court of Protection declared that it was lawful and in the patient’s 
best interests for her clinicians (a) not to make any further attempt to secure a 
means of providing artificial nutrition; and (b) to withdraw the provision of 
intravenous fluids. The decision concerned ‘withholding’ rather than 
‘withdrawing’ treatment. 
It appears, very strongly, that the court will use a balance sheet approach to 
determine the best interests of the person concerned provided that a robust 
and definitive diagnosis has been reached with the latter being of fundamental 
importance. In CWM TAF115, for example, even though the case concerned a 
patient suspected to be in permanent VS, the court pronounced on the lack of 
assessments which had been carried out for the purposes of the hearing.  
These were considered to have been carried out by practitioners who lacked 
the requisite training and expertise. Reference was once again made to the 
Royal College of Physician’s guidance that required that "assessors for the 
diagnosis of which the court is concerned should meet the minimum 
                                                          
111 Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
112 Airedale Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
113 W v M [2012] 1 All ER 1313. 
114 United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v N [2014] EWCOP 16. 
115 CWM TAF University (applicant) v F [2015] EWHC 2533 (Fam) para 13. This case concerned an application 
for a declaration that withdrawal of CANH would be in the best interests of a patient in a permanent VS. The 
declaration was not given on the basis that clinical evaluations had been insufficiently robust and had not been 
carried out by experts with the requisite level of skill.  
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requirements set out, both as to experience and training".116 The application 
was therefore refused on the basis that the judge did not feel confident that 
this requirement had been met.  
Conclusion 
On the basis of this empirical study it is suggested that whether patients in a 
MCS have access to a range of specialist advanced diagnostic techniques is due 
largely to the vagaries of circumstances and most notably to the availability of 
skilled health professionals and access to validated structured neurological 
assessment tools and expertise.   But to what extent should reassessment be 
considered as a right, rather than a mere twist of fate governed by chance 
availability of specialist resources? 
 
Current law that concerns people in MCS reveals very clearly that applications 
for declaratory relief will be countenanced only following assessment by 
SMART and WHIM (or other similarly validated tool) to confirm the person’s 
true diagnosis.  Nevertheless, reliance on definitive diagnostic assessment and 
reassessment at this time is perhaps too late to meet the for the real best 
interests of the person concerned.  Surely the best interests of the person 
would mandate that accurate and reliable assessment is carried out at an 
earlier stage to inform and underpin the very best rehabilitation and treatment 
efforts to provide them with every opportunity to enhance their quality of life, 
or alternatively to withdraw treatment where continuation is futile and no 
longer best for the person in the best interests of the person concerned.  
Using a grounded theory approach the key emergent themes from the analysis 
were that context driven factors provided the trigger for (re)assessment and 
that ‘supported’ patients had a greater likelihood of accessing specialist 
(re)assessment services. A key finding of the study was the notable lack of an 
expectation of a right to reassessment, at least in the legal sense.  
Nonetheless, a right was recognised as conceived as a moral normative 
expectation. Ultimately, there was no unified or coherent decision-making 
approach to decisions to reassess.  On the basis of these findings it is appears 
that if a right to reassessment is to have real meaning then there is a need to 
                                                          
116 Royal College of Physicians, Prolonged disorders of consciousness: national clinical guidelines (2013) Royal 
College of Physicians, London. Section 2. 
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commit to the rights based agenda for this patient group whose interests 
might otherwise be marginalised.  However, it has become clear from recent 
determinations that expert assessment has now become a mandatory 
expectation before declaratory relief will be provided by the courts but only 
when withdrawal or withholding of treatment is being considered.117   
It is apparent that there is no right to reassessment, as holistically defined.  
This aligns with established common law principles that there is no definitive 
right to any form of medical treatment or diagnostic intervention. 
Notwithstanding this, best practice guidance from the Royal College of 
Physicians mandates that reassessment is a cornerstone of good clinical care 
for this patient group and ought to be carried out at least annually.  As such 
perhaps it is hoped that annual reassessment will perhaps become established 
as the new Bolam standard for care for this patient group.118 At the same time 
advanced diagnostic and assessment tools and strategies used to assess 
neurological condition and status have been demanded by courts to underpin 
their decisions as to whether withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is in the 
best interests of people in MCS.119 This development is perhaps the strongest 
indication that the use of advanced diagnostic techniques, at least for the 
purposes of best interests adjudications, has already become a legal 
requirement.  
Reassessment at this particular time in the patient’s journey when withdrawal 
of CANH is being considered is at this stage perhaps at its very least useful 
from the perspective of the best interests on the person. Advanced 
reassessment techniques are expensive and time-consuming.  Notwithstanding 
their obvious use to ascertain whether or not the patient’s best interests is to 
stay alive, reassessment carried out at an earlier stage could be more positively 
targeted with better use of scarce healthcare resources.  A positive outcome 
can be expected to lead to greater and more focused rehabilitative efforts and 
better outcomes for intensive use of resources, whereas negative findings may 
consolidate thoughts towards withdrawal of heroic efforts to keep the patient 
alive.  More tangible evidence that the patient’s condition is permanent may 
                                                          
117 All the case law stemming from W v M [2012] 1 All ER 1313 to the present.  
118 Samanta A, Mello M, Foster C, Tingle J, Samanta J, The role of clinical guidelines in medical litigation: a shift 
from the Bolam standard? (2006) Med Law Rev 14(3) 321-366. 
119 W v M [2012] 1 All ER 1313; CWM TAF University v F [2015] EWHC 2533 (Fam). 
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provide earlier and more reliable bases for decisions to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, where this is considered to be best for the patient. 
Meeting this challenge is a duty for which those responsible can, and must, be 
held accountable.  
These ‘rights’ which now evidently receive judicial recognition should be 
required and implemented at an earlier stage of the journey of a patient’s life 
in MCS and most certainly before a stage where withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment is being contemplated. 
 
 
